国际问题研究 理论研究

美中过招人民币(英汉对照)

TRADING BLOWS

赵庆秋

2010-07-07 04:48


    At last, the mountain moved. After months of subtle diplomacy from the US Treasury and not so subtle threats from Congress, China two weeks ago grudgingly gave its currency, the renminbi, a little more freedom to rise.
    终于,高山出现了松动。在美国财政部含蓄的外交攻势以及美国国会不那么含蓄的威胁持续数月之后,两周前,中国勉为其难地表示将增强人民币汇率弹性,使其多一点升值的自由空间。
   
    The exchange rate issue dominates a relationship that will shape the future of the world economy – the confrontation between the US, the economic superpower of the 20th century, and China, the rising industrial hegemony of the 21st. Washington, with occasional support from Europe and selected emerging markets, says Chinese currency policy unbalances the world economy and disadvantages foreign companies.
    汇率问题是中美关系的主导因素——而20世纪经济超级大国美国和21世纪逐渐崛起的工业霸主中国之间的对抗将决定世界经济的未来。华盛顿方面表示(偶尔也能得到欧洲和某些新兴市场国家的支持),中国汇率政策导致全球经济失衡,置外国企业于不利地位。
   
    But even if the currency rises significantly, as the White House demands, the US still faces myriad challenges managing its trade and investment relationship with Beijing.
    但就算人民币如白宫所要求的那样大幅升值,在掌控与中国的贸易与投资关系方面,美国仍然面临诸多挑战。
   
    With discontent rising across American business, fuelled by incidents such as the Google China censorship spat, Washington is recognising to its intense frustration that it lacks the instruments to conduct international trade policy in a modern economy.
    类似谷歌中国(Google China)审查纠纷的事件,加剧了美国商界的普遍不满,华盛顿极度沮丧地意识到,自己缺乏在现代经济环境中处理国际贸易政策的工具。
   
    “China is distorting global trade and investment patterns with a web of state-sponsored industrial policies,” says Jeremie Waterman of the US Chamber of Commerce. “The tools the US government has are inadequate to cope with this interlocking web.”
    “中国正在撒下一张政府支持的产业政策大网,扭曲了全球贸易与投资格局,”美国商会(US Chamber of Commerce)的王杰(Jeremie Waterman)表示。“美国政府所拥有的工具,不足以对付这张环环相扣的大网。”
   
    The old-fashioned architecture of US trade policy largely reflects the metal-bashing economy of the past. It is predicated – as is the focus on the exchange rate – on its manufacturers competing head-on with Chinese companies, particularly in the American market.
    美国贸易政策的过时架构在很大程度上反映了昔日那种敲铜打铁的经济。这种政策建立在美国制造商与中国企业正面竞争(特别是在美国市场)的基础上,对汇率的关注亦如此。
   
    The US has a panoply of “trade defence” instruments – antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard measures – that allow it to block imports it deems unfairly priced, state-subsidised or flooding in too rapidly. One such tool was used in September last year to restrict Chinese tyre imports, provoking a storm of protest from free-traders.
    美国拥有全套的“贸易自卫”工具——反倾销、反补贴税、以及保护措施——使其得以对被视为定价不公、获得补贴或增长迅速的进口商品实施限制。去年9月,美国政府便动用了此类工具之一,以求限制从中国进口轮胎,此举引发了自由贸易者的强烈抗议。
   
    But the goods to which the US applies such measures are mainly basic, low-margin industrial components in which American competitiveness is being eroded against many countries. The list hit with trade defence protection in recent months does not read like a tour of America''s economic future: drill pipe, phosphate salts, coated paper.
    但美国实施的这些措施主要针对利润率低的基本工业零件,在这部分市场,美国的竞争优势正逐渐为许多国家所侵蚀。最近几个月遭受贸易自卫保护措施冲击的进口商品清单,看上去不像是美国经济的未来所在:钻探管、磷酸盐,铜版纸。
   
    Francisco Sánchez, undersecretary for international trade at the Commerce department, notes such products cover less than 3 per cent of US trade with China. Yet because the industries are long established and often have powerful labour unions, they exert disproportionate control over trade policy. When China joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001, the negotiators'' focus was on goods such as these, and particularly the eternally controversial area of garments and textiles.
    美国商务部负责国际贸易的副部长弗朗西斯科•桑切斯(Francisco Sánchez)指出,这些产品在美中贸易中所占比例还不到3%。然而,由于这些工业部门历史悠久,且常常拥有势力强大的工会,因此对于贸易政策拥有与其自身规模并不相称的控制权。中国于2001年加入世界贸易组织(WTO)时,这类商品是谈判重点,尤其是争议不断的服装与纺织品领域。
   
    “When China joined the WTO, the US and Europe put huge amounts of effort into keeping Chinese clothes out through negotiating multiple layers of trade defences,” says Gary Horlick, a leading Washington trade lawyer. Now these measures “are becoming not just an irrelevance but a distraction”, he says. Time and political capital are expended pursuing trade policies irrelevant to most American companies.
    direct industrial development with government procurement.
    “中国加入世贸组织时,美国和欧洲耗费大量精力,试图通过商定一层又一层的贸易保护措施,将中国制造的服装关在门外,”华盛顿知名贸易律师加里•霍力克(Gary Horlick)表示。他说,如今这些措施“不仅变得无关紧要,而且分散了注意力”。美国政府花费了大量时间和政治资本,去实行与大多数美国公司毫不相干的贸易政策。
   
    As China''s domestic market has rapidly grown, US and European companies have become increasingly interested in locating production there – and particularly in selling services such as telecommunications, information technology and media. But many are struggling. Beijing, under the rubric of its “indigenous innovation” policy, is instituting what foreign companies say is a complex system of skewed government procurement, unfair and arbitrary licensing policies and forced technology transfer that violates intellectual property rights (IPR).
    随着中国国内市场迅速增长,美国和欧洲企业越来越有兴趣将生产环节设在中国,尤其希望在中国兜售电信、信息科技和媒体等服务。但许多企业都面临困境。据外资企业表示,在“自主创新”政策的指导下,中国政府正在实行一套复杂制度,包括倾斜的政府采购、不公平及霸道的许可发放政策、以及侵犯知识产权的强制性技术转移。
   
    Mr Waterman traces the policy back to 2002, when China had finally joined the WTO. “Once the negotiations had ended, those elements who preferred a stronger role for government were freed up,” he says. “The Hu-Wen government from 2003 inherited an economy where they saw few [Chinese] companies in high-wage sectors and in IPR-dependent industries, and set about trying to change it.” The gigantic $568bn fiscal stimulus Beijing announced in November 2008 gave them more ammunition to direct industrial development with government procurement.
    沃特曼认为,这种政策可追溯至2002年中国终于加入世贸组织之时。“一旦谈判结束,那些提倡由政府扮演更强势角色的人士便松了绑,”他表示。“胡温政府2003年上台时所继承的中国经济,在高薪酬领域和依靠知识产权的行业几乎没有(中国)企业,于是他们着手改变这种状况。”北京方面在2008年11月宣布的5680亿美元巨额财政刺激措施,为他们提供了更多资源,用于通过政府采购来引导工业发展。
   
    Beijing says it is merely trying to do what other countries have done – modernise its economy, ascend the value chain and ease away from dependence on foreign companies for investment and technology.
    北京方面称,自己不过是在努力实现其它国家已经完成的事情——实现经济现代化、向价值链上游迁徙、并逐渐摆脱在投资和技术方面对外国企业的依赖。
   
    But US companies say “indigenous innovation” goes way beyond familiar problems with software and movie piracy, and amounts to a full-blown system of government manipulation of large swaths of the economy.
    但美国企业表示,“自主创新”产生的问题远不仅仅是人们熟知的盗版软件和盗版碟片那么简单,而是相当于政府对大量经济部门的全面操纵。
   
    Procurement is used to favour Chinese companies. Idiosyncratic technical standards such as a home­grown wireless technology – “Wapi” – are given a clear run by denying licensing to more familiar international standards. Information, communication and technology companies complain about restrictions, such as requirements for products to be certified and tested in government laboratories, and for businesses to disclose source code.
    政府采购被用作偏袒中国企业的工具。本土无线网络技术Wapi之类的中国特有技术标准获得了领先优势,因为其它更为人熟知的国际标准未能获得政府许可。信息、通讯和科技企业对政府限制措施满腹怨言,例如要求产品必须在国家实验室进行检测并得到认证,企业必须公布源代码等。
   
    Alarm about this is rising to the point where business representatives are increasingly prepared to criticise policy publicly. “We are feeling less and less welcome in China, which is why you are seeing more people speaking out and reconsidering their futures in China,” says John Neuffer of the Information Technology Industry Council.
    关于这个问题的忧虑情绪已经上升到一定高度,以致商界代表日趋准备公开批评政府政策。“我们感觉在中国越来越不受欢迎了,这就是为什么你会发现有更多人大胆表态,并反思自己在中国的未来,”信息技术产业理事会(Information Technology Industry Council)的约翰•纽佛(John Neuffer)表示。
   
    Last week Jeffrey Immelt, chief executive of GE, expressed his growing concern about Beijing, telling an audience of Italian executives that “I am not sure that in the end they want any of us to win, or any of us to be successful”.
    上周,通用电气(GE)首席执行官杰弗里•伊梅尔特(Jeffrey Immelt)表达了其对中国政府日益加剧的担忧。他对一群意大利高管听众说道:“我不确定最终他们是否想让我们中的任何一个人赢,或者让我们中的任何一个人取得成功。”
   
    The menu of options available to cope with such problems is limited. The most obvious is litigation at the WTO. Here the US has had some, but not spectacular, success. In 2004, in its first complaint against China, it forced Beijing to remove preferential treatment for local semiconductor producers; in 2008, it won a case against Chinese rules on car parts. More recently it was successful in two landmark cases – one on enforcement of IPR and one on restrictions on the domestic distribution of films and books. It is currently considering a case over restrictions on foreign credit cards.
    可用来应付这些问题的选项是有限的。最显而易见的就是WTO诉讼。在这方面,美国取得过一些成功,但并不惊人。2004年,它首次对中国提出申诉,并成功迫使北京撤销了对本土半导体生产商的优惠待遇;2008年,在申诉中国汽车零部件规定的案件中,它也取得了胜利;最近,它还赢得了两宗具有里程碑意义的诉讼案:一宗是关于知识产权的执法、另一宗是关于中国对电影与图书在国内分销的限制。目前,它正在考虑就中国出台的限制外国信用卡的规定,向WTO提出申诉。
   
    But this strategy costs time and effort, and is not a cure-all. After the two or three years it can take to bring and win a case and an appeal, the remedy often comes too late. In the car-parts case, US business experts say, the delay gave Chinese industry more time to develop and American industry to weaken, foiling the goal of allowing US car-parts companies export significant quantities to China. Mr Neuffer notes that dispute settlement is even slower for high-tech industries, where product lifecycles can be less than a year.
    但这一策略既费时又费力,且无法解决所有的问题。从提起诉讼到赢得诉讼,再到赢得上诉,需经历两到三年的时间,纠正方法常常来得太迟。在上面提及的汽车零部件案中,美国商业专家表示,这种迟滞给了中国工业更多的时间发展、给了美国工业更多的时间弱化,使得美国汽车零部件公司未能实现扩大对华出口的目标。纽佛指出,高科技行业的争端解决时间甚至更长,而其产品的生命周期却可能不到一年。
   
    Scott Lincicome of White & Case, a Washington law firm, says WTO litigation is one of the more attractive options, especially as Beijing has started to accept it as a normal part of trade relations, not a declaration of war. But it has drawbacks: “On issues like IPR there is very limited case law, and governments are very reluctant to bring cases unless they are fairly certain they will win them.”
    华盛顿伟凯律师事务所(White & Case)的斯科特•林西科姆(Scott Lincicome)表示,WTO诉讼是比较有吸引力的选择之一,尤其是北京如今已开始接受其为贸易关系中正常的组成部分,而非外国向自己宣战。但这种手段存在缺陷:“在知识产权这类问题上,判例法非常有限,所以,政府十分不愿意提出申诉,除非他们相当确定自己会赢得官司。”
   
    The fact that much of what China is doing falls outside normal WTO agreements presents a wider problem. The prospect of changing this in the medium term, with the Doha round of global trade talks in limbo, looks bleak. Indeed, Michael Punke, US ambassador to the WTO, complains that Chinese negotiators are not even engaging seriously in talks.
    中国目前很多行为都已超越WTO常规协定范畴的事实,带来了更广泛的问题。考虑到多哈(Doha)回合全球贸易谈判陷入僵局,在中期内改变这一现状的前景看上去比较黯淡。的确,美国驻WTO大使迈克尔•彭克(Michael Punke)抱怨称,中方谈判人员甚至都不认真投入谈判。
   
    There are no strong rules about promoting competition in markets in WTO agreements. There is an agreement whereby governments commit to put public purchases of goods and services out to international tender but China has never signed.
    在WTO的诸多协定中,并没有有关推动市场竞争的强有力条款。仅有一个协议,规定签署国政府须将商品及服务的公共采购付诸国际招标,但中国从未签署这一协议。
   
    “Government procurement in China is actually much more important to the American and European economies and companies [than issues such as textiles], but much less effort was put into getting China to join,” Mr Horlick says. China says it will make an offer to sign up this month but appears to have ruled out including regional and local government and state-owned enterprises, thus punching huge holes in any new commitment.
    霍力克表示:“对于欧美经济体与企业而言,中国的政府采购实际上比(纺织品等问题)重要得多,但它们在说服中国签署该协议上付出的努力却少得多。”中国表示,它将于本月提交签约提议,但似乎排除了地区及地方政府以及国企的采购,因此将会给任何新的承诺留下巨大的缺口。
   
    Debbie Stabenow, Democratic senator from Michigan, has proposed a bill that would cut China off from US government procurement if it does not open its own market. But few investors seem to think that would make a tremendous difference. Rules such as the “Buy American” provision already restrict China from bidding for some government contracts, against which Beijing has in turn complained.
    密歇根州的民主党议员黛比•史戴布诺(Debbie Stabenow)已经提交了一份议案,称如果中国不开放自己的市场,美国将不允许其参加本国的政府采购。但似乎没有投资者认为,这会让事情有巨大的改变。“购买美国货”(Buy American)规定等规则,已经限制中国投标某些政府合同,中国政府也已对此提出抱怨。
   
    In theory, companies could try using bilateral investment treaties – which prevent host governments maltreating foreign investors – and argue that Beijing''s actions are in effect expropriating their investment. But the US does not have a tradition of signing such treaties, and an investment pact Washington was negotiating with Beijing has been put on hold pending a US review.
    理论上,企业可以尝试使用阻止东道国政府粗暴对待外国投资者的双边投资协定,辩称,北京的行动事实上是在剥夺他们的投资。但美国没有签署这些协定的传统,且华盛顿与北京商谈的一项投资协定仍处于搁置状态,等待美方的评估。
   
    This leaves companies and the government having to rely on suasion through regular contacts, including the annual official strategic and economic dialogue.
    这使得企业与美国政府不得不依赖定期接触进行劝说,包括一年一度的官方战略与经济对话。
   
    Private US business associations say that in cases involving product standards, Beijing will often announce a restrictive policy and then retreat after an outcry from foreign business groups.
    民间的美国商业协会表示,在涉及产品标准的案例中,北京往往会宣布一项限制性政策,如果外国企业集团发出强烈的抗议,它又会将其撤销。
   
    Tim Stratford, a former assistant US trade representative, now at the law firm Covington & Burling in Beijing, says that China is susceptible to some political arguments. “You can make the case that most countries behave in a particular way and China is placing itself outside those norms,” he says. “Or you can argue that China will lose support from other countries if it acts this way.”
    美国前助理贸易代表、如今任职于柯温顿-柏林律所(Covington and Burling)北京分公司的夏尊恩(Tim Stratford)表示,中国容易受一些政治主张的影响。他说:“你可以辩称,大多数国家都以某一特定的方式行事,而中国却将自己放在这些行为规则之外。或者,你可以辩称,如果它继续这种作为,中国将失去其它国家的支持。”
   
    But at the moment, he says, a mutual lack of trust hampers the resolution of a wide range of issues. A fundamental mismatch of expectations, it appears, is the real problem currently bedevilling relations.
    但他表示,目前而言,彼此缺乏信任阻碍了一系列问题的解决。双方在预期上的根本错配,似乎是当前困扰两国贸易关系的真正问题。
   
    What China sees as legitimate tools to promote its economic development are regarded in Washington as abuses of state and market power, and it is becoming painfully obvious that the US lacks the power to correct them.
   
    中国眼中的推动经济发展的合法工具,在华盛顿看来却是在滥用政府与市场权力,且日益明显的是,美国缺乏纠正这种情况的能力,这令其苦恼。
   
    One thing is clear: the temporary resolution of the currency problem has not ended the friction in trade and economic relations between the US and China.
    有一件事是明确的:人民币汇率问题的暂时解决,并没有结束美中经贸关系中的摩擦。
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2018-07-14 10:33
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朝鲜三十年今昔